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Abstract
Theories of embodied language comprehension have proposed that language is understood
through perceptual simulation of the sensorimotor characteristics of its meaning. Strong support
for this claim requires demonstration of encoding-based activation of sensorimotor representations
that is distinct from task-related or goal-driven processes. Participants in three eye-tracking
experiments were presented with triplets of either numbers or object and animal names. In
Experiment 1, participants indicated whether the size of the referent of the middle object or animal
name was in between the size of the two outer items. In Experiment 2, the object and animal
names were encoded for an immediate recognition memory task. In Experiment 3, participants
completed the same comparison task of Experiment 1 for both words and numbers. During the
comparison tasks, word and number decision times showed a symbolic distance effect, such that
response time was inversely related to the size difference between the items. A symbolic distance
effect was also observed for animal and object encoding times in cases where encoding time likely
reflected some goal-driven processes as well. When semantic size was irrelevant to the task
(Experiment 2), it had no effect on word encoding times. Number encoding times showed a
numerical distance priming effect: encoding time increased with numerical difference between
items. Together these results suggest that while activation of numerical magnitude representations
is encoding-based as well as goal-driven, activation of size information associated with words is
goal-driven and does not occur automatically during encoding. This conclusion challenges strong
theories of embodied cognition which claim that language comprehension consists of activation of
analog sensorimotor representations irrespective of higher level processes related to context or
task-specific goals.
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Reading a word allows us to access different aspects of its meaning. On the one hand, we
may understand a word that has a concrete referent by virtue of its connection to other
internal symbols or associations that provide information about categories, semantic
relations, or linguistic co-occurrence. On the other hand, we may understand that word’s
meaning through our experience with its referent’s sensory characteristics such as color,
shape and size. The role of such analog sensory representations in word meaning has been
examined in contemporary cognitive psychology since the 1960s, with mental imagery
recognized as playing an important role in memory (Baddeley, 1986; Paivio, 1986), thought
(Kosslyn, 1980), and with spatial representations seen as crucial to the construction of
mental models (Bower & Morrow, 1990; Glenberg, Meyer & Lindem, 1987; Johnson-Laird,
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1983). More recently, sensorimotor experiences have been assigned a central role in
language processing within the field of embodied cognition.
Embodied cognition has become an umbrella term referring to a broad and highly diverse
movement within cognitive science, with the defining premise that the body and bodily
action play a central role in shaping cognition (Wilson, 2002). This approach addresses the
origins of knowledge as well as how knowledge is represented mentally and neurally during
information processing. Knowledge of concepts is argued to emerge from perceptual
experience and to be represented not in an amodal semantic faculty but in the very same
sensorimotor systems that originated the experience (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg &
Robertson, 2000; Zwaan, 2004; Zwaan & Madden, 2005). The embodied approach to
language processing includes a number of psychological theories proposing that words are
understood through “perceptual simulation” or activation of sensorimotor representations of
concepts. According to Barsalou’s perceptual symbol systems hypothesis (Barsalou, 1999),
language comprehension takes place through a process of words activating simulators
associated with the perceptual properties of their referents, creating a perceptual simulation
of a text or utterance that preserves the analog properties of what is represented. Similarly,
the immersed experiencer framework (Zwaan, 2004) describes language comprehension as a
process of “vicarious experience of the described situation” (p. 36). Importantly, perceptual
simulation within the embodied framework is not an optional aid to comprehension. Instead,
representation of concepts is inherently perceptual, and processing language for
comprehension consists of perceptual simulation or immersed experience.
Important empirical support for the embodied account of online language comprehension is
provided by demonstrations of activation of sensorimotor properties of word meaning during
reading and spoken language comprehension. For example, in studies of sentence
processing, participants respond faster to pictured objects if the picture matches the shape or
orientation of the object that was implied in a previously read sentence (the appearance-
compatibility effect: Stanfield & Zwaan, 2010; Wassenburg & Zwaan, 2010; Zwaan,
Stanfield & Yaxley, 2002) or when the action required to make a response matches the
action that is described in the sentence (the action-compatibility effect: Glenberg & Kaschak,
2002). In addition, canonical visuospatial features of spoken words can affect eye-
movements during visual search tasks (Yee, Huffstetler & Thompson-Schill, 2011) as well
as performance on concurrent spatial reaction time tasks (Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou &
McRae, 2003; Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock & Narayanan, 2007).
These studies and many others effectively demonstrate activation of visuospatial and motor
representations during sentence or word comprehension. However, critics of the embodied
account of language processing have argued against the idea that conceptual representations
consist of sensorimotor information, as well as the suggestion that online language
processing is mandatorily driven by activation of sensorimotor representations. Critics of the
empirical evidence for activation of sensorimotor representation during online language
processing have argued that some behavioral effects that have been attributed to activation
of embodied representations during language processing might also be explained by
symbolic processes. For example, evidence that lexical processing can be facilitated when
words are presented in a way that matches their embodied perceptual experience (known as
“spatial iconicity,” e.g. “ceiling” appearing above “floor”) (Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003) may
also be explained by the frequency with which pairs of words occur in particular orders
(Tse, Kurby & Du, 2010). This finding highlights the possibility that statistical patterns
among linguistic symbols can be used in some cases to derive physical or perceptual
relationships between referents (Louwerse, 2008). Additionally, recent work in perception
and perceptual learning suggests that perceptual encoding involves the extraction of
complex and abstract relations from the environment. As such, ‘perceptual representations’
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themselves are considered abstract relational structures, while the actual basic sensory
features are fleeting and do not become a part of the accessible output of the encoding
process (Kellman & Massey, 2013).
Critics of the idea that conceptual representations consist of sensorimotor information have
argued further that demonstrations of sensorimotor activation during conceptual processing
do not provide evidence that sensorimotor representations are constitutive of the concept or
even conceptually relevant (Adams, 2010; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Weiskopf, 2010).
For example, Mahon & Caramazza suggest that the observed sensorimotor effects may arise
from activation originating in abstract, disembodied representations spreading into systems
capable of sensorimotor representation. This would occur not because language
comprehension inherently involves activation of sensorimotor activation, but because such
activation is driven by higher order task and goal-related processes.
This sort of goal-driven account of embodied activation is supported by empirical work
assessing task-related influences on sensorimotor activation during language processing.
Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) found that processing of picture pairs was more strongly
affected by real-world canonical spatial relations than processing of words, especially when
the task involved spatial iconicity judgments. Conversely, processing of word pairs was
more strongly affected by frequency of word order, especially when the task involved
semantic relatedness judgments. When the task required assessment of physical
relationships, sensory information was activated and facilitated performance, but when the
task involved judgment of symbolic relationships, statistical properties of language better
explained reaction time patterns. Similarly, property verification judgments (e.g. “Can a
moth be speckled?”) can be affected by linguistic co-occurrence as well as perceptually
represented information about referent modality. However, fast judgments are more likely to
be affected by linguistically encoded relationships, while slower responses were more
sensitive to perceptual information (Louwerse & Connell, 2011). Assuming that goal-driven
activation takes more time than encoding-based activation, this result supports a goal-driven
account of perceptual properties of concepts.
Understanding the role of goals in driving activation of sensorimotor representations is
important because the defining difference between the embodied cognition account of
language processing and current “disembodied” accounts is precisely the idea that embodied
language comprehension is driven by direct, mandatory activation of ‘experiential
representations’ taking place at the word level of language comprehension (Zwaan, 2004).
Accordingly, conceptual representations are argued to consist of sensorimotor information at
their core, rather than activating such information peripherally through spreading activation.
“Whereas such knowledge is cumbersome and brittle in amodal symbol systems…it ‘rides
for free’ in perceptual symbol systems” (Barsalou, 1999, p. 604, quotations in original).
As such, the embodied cognition account of language processing predicts encoding-based
activation during the reading of words irrespective of higher-level processes related to
context or task-specific goals. In contrast, a disembodied account of language
comprehension can explain the appearance- and action-compatibility effects by assuming
that flow of activation within and between cognitive systems is largely goal-driven.
Evidence for goal-driven activation of sensorimotor representations provides support for
what might be called a weak (or conventional) form of embodied cognition where language-
processing goals guide the flexible use of different representational formats (including
embodied ones). This approach to embodiment is not weak in the sense that it characterizes
sensorimotor representations as unimportant, but rather that it does not characterize them as
foundational representations that necessarily have priority in processing. Such a description
fits many approaches to mental representation that have developed within traditional
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cognitive psychology (e.g., for visual imagery see Kosslyn, 1980; for stimulus-response
compatibility see Kornblum, Hasbroucq & Osman, 1990). In contrast, support for a strong
(or radical) form of embodied cognition requires evidence of encoding-based activation of
embodied representations irrespective of task goals, a pattern that would show that
sensorimotor representations have general priority in processing.
Analog representations of magnitude
A variety of useful tasks have been developed that provide insight into the processing of
representations of semantic magnitudes associated with symbols such as words and
numbers. Tasks involving comparison of magnitudes have consistently shown the symbolic
distance effect -- the finding that the time required to determine the larger of two visually
presented numerals is an inverse function of the difference between the two numerals (Henik
& Tzelgov, 1982; Koechlin, Naccache, Block & Dehaene, 1999; Moyer & Landauer, 1967;
Van Opstal, Gevers, De Moor & Verguts, 2008). For example, choosing the larger number
of the pair 2 and 8 takes less time than making the same choice for the pair 6 and 8. Reaction
times depend more strongly on the ratio of the pair of numbers than on their absolute
difference and in this way resemble a classic psychophysical function. The same effect
occurs when participants compare lexical stimuli instead of numbers, such that choosing the
larger or smaller of a pair of animal names is facilitated for pairs with a large difference in
size (lobster – cow) compared to a small difference in size (sheep – cow). This finding is
impressively robust (Banks & Flora, 1977; Dean et al., 2005; Holyoak, Dumais & Moyer,
1979; Moyer & Bayer, 1976) and occurs for a variety of other types of words and
dimensions (Dean et al., 2005; Holyoak & Walker, 1976; Paivio & Te Linde, 1980; Te
Linde & Paivio, 1979). The pattern of reaction times is similar to that found for actual
perceptual comparisons such as choosing the longer of two lines (Johnson, 1939) or the
larger of two circles (Moyer & Bayer, 1976). Therefore, the symbolic distance effect is
generally thought to indicate a conversion process of abstract numbers or words into analog
representations on the dimension of interest, such as numerical magnitude or animal size.
The comparison decision is then made based on these analog representations, constituting an
“internal psychophysical judgment” (Moyer, 1973 p.183).
While symbolic comparison effects provide insight into the way that we process symbolic
stimuli, the trial-final reaction times measured in these tasks do not provide direct insight
into the encoding of symbols because they are influenced by other task-relevant processes
such as comparison, decision making and response selection. In contrast, distance priming
tasks are thought to measure the effects of encoding-based activation. The numerical
distance priming effect is the finding that responses to a numerical target are faster when it is
preceded by a number that is close in magnitude than by one that is distant. For example,
processing the digit 6 is facilitated when preceded by the prime 4 compared to the prime 2
(Brysbaert, 1995; Den Heyer & Briand, 1986; Marcel & Forrin, 1974; Reynvoet, Brysbaert
& Fias 2002). This effect is found both when the prime requires a deliberate response and
during short SOA masked priming (Koechlin, Naccache, Block, & Dehaene, 1999), and has
been found with verbal numerals (four, six) as well as Arabic numerals and non-symbolic
quantities such as dot patterns (Herrera & Macizo, 2008). In addition, the effect occurs even
when successful execution of the task does not require activation of the number’s magnitude
(Brysbaert, 1995; Van Opstal & Verguts, 2011). Importantly, comparison to letter stimuli
has shown that numerical distance priming relies on activation of magnitude rather than
simply order information, since the (alphabetical) order information associated with letters
leads to comparison distance effects, but not distance priming (Van Opstal, Gevers, De
Moor & Verguts, 2008).
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Few studies have explicitly investigated whether analog representations of size associated
with lexical items that refer to objects also lead to size-based priming effects during
encoding. Referent size of individual words has not been found to reliably affect
performance on a lexical decision task, likely because size information does not help to
distinguish words from non-words (Kang, Yap, Tse & Kurby, 2011). There is some
evidence that priming occurs based on overlap in perceptual properties of words’ referents,
(Flores d’Arcais & Glazenborg, 1985; Schreuder, Flores d’Aracais, & Glazenborg, 1984) so
that “orange” can prime “ball” by virtue of both objects being round. However, other work
suggests that these effects may occur only when perceptual information is first made salient
to the comprehender (Pecher, Zeelenberg & Raaijmakers, 1998), leaving an unclear picture
of the role of task-related and goal-driven processes on perceptual priming with lexical
items.
Current study
In the symbolic distance effect and numerical distance priming, proximity in the semantic
magnitude of two stimuli have opposite effects on reaction time, and for this reason the two
effects are thought to measure different levels of processing. The symbolic distance effect,
or facilitation of comparison decisions for numbers that are numerically distant, takes place
at the task or goal-related level of comprehension. At this level, symbolic comparison tasks
with lexical items robustly show reaction time patterns similar to numbers, suggesting that
both numerical and lexical symbolic comparison decisions are based on analog
representations. As with other priming effects, numerical distance priming is observed at
encoding, thus providing substantial evidence for the analog representation of numerical
semantic magnitude at the encoding or word-meaning level. This provides the opportunity to
distinguish between activation at the encoding and goal-driven stages of language
comprehension based on distinct patterns of reaction time within a single task.
Brysbaert (1995) created a novel numerical-priming paradigm that is especially well-suited
to the goal of distinguishing encoding-based priming from goal-driven comparison effects.
Participants in an eye-tracking experiment were presented with triplets of Arabic numerals
and asked to indicate whether the middle numeral was numerically in between the two outer
numbers. In conjunction with eye-tracking, the use of three numbers, rather than the typical
two, allowed encoding and decision processes to be isolated in a single task. Encoding of the
middle number takes place before a comparison decision must be made, since all
information needed to make a correct decision is available only after the third number has
been processed. As such, time spent looking at the middle number provided a measure of
encoding time. A gaze-contingent display technique was used in which the numbers were
masked except when the participant looked at them during first-pass reading from left to
right. This eliminated preview and rereading effects that might have reduced the value of
looking time as a measure of encoding. Brysbaert observed a numerical distance priming
effect on the middle number, such that its encoding time was reduced on trials with a small
numerical difference between the first and middle number, compared to trials with a larger
difference. Crucially, the same effect was observed when, instead of judging magnitude-
order, participants simply encoded each triplet into memory for an immediate recognition
task, demonstrating encoding-based activation of semantic magnitude associated with
numbers independent of goal-based activation related to the reader’s task. The current study
extends Brysbaert’s distance-priming paradigm to words referring to objects in order to
assess whether activation of magnitude information about semantic size associated with
lexical items is encoding- or goal-based.
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This experiment applied Brysbaert’s (1995) gaze-contingent triplet-comparison task to
object and animal names. As illustrated in Figure 1, participants read three words (all
referring either to objects or animals) and then indicated with a speeded key-press whether
the size of the referent of the middle word was between the sizes of the referents of the first
and last word. The three object or animal names were shown from left-to-right on a screen,
and a gaze-contingent display technique was used so that each name could only be encoded
during the eyes’ first-pass over that word. Triplets of words were constructed so that the
distance in the semantic size of the second and first items was small, medium or large. The
task provides two measures of interest: (1) Decision time is the interval between when the
eyes first look at the final name in the triplet and the execution of the manual response; it
includes goal-based activation of task-relevant semantic properties since it covers the time
during which all information needed to perform the task is available. (2) Encoding time is
the gaze duration on the middle word, a measure that is widely accepted in the eye-tracking
literature as sensitive to lexical encoding (e.g., Inhoff, 1984; Morris, 1994; Rayner, 1998). In
Brysbaert’s study, this measure showed distance priming for Arabic numerals indicating that
it reflected encoding-based activation of numerical magnitude information.
To our knowledge, theories of embodied cognition have not previously been applied to
distance-priming or the symbolic distance effect. However, these theories have proposed
that sensorimotor representations are the foundation of the meaning of language and that
language comprehension involves perceptual simulations of the meaning of what is being
understood (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Zwaan, 2004; Zwaan & Madden,
2005), rather than having sensorimotor representations activated based on task goals as
critics have contended (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Adams, 2010). As such, we believe that
the strong (or radical) embodied cognition approach leads naturally to the prediction for this
task that distance priming should be found for encoding time on the middle object or animal
name as Brysbaert (1995) found for numerals, because encoding a name should involve
creation of a representation that captures the perceptual properties of its referent. In contrast,
the goal-driven activation account suggests that the visuospatial characteristics of a word’s
referent are not activated automatically during encoding but that instead this information is
accessed in a goal-driven manner at a later stage of language processing. Therefore, the
goal-driven activation account does not predict distance priming on encoding time and
instead suggests that any effects of semantic distance should be understood in terms of how
semantic distance affects the processes that are invoked by the task goals. Both the
embodied-cognition and goal-driven activation approaches lead to the prediction that the
decision-time measure should show a symbolic distance effect since the difficulty of
comparing the size of perceptual representations is inversely related to the difference in their
sizes (Moyer & Bayer, 1976; Banks & Flora, 1977; Holyoak et al., 1979; Dean et al., 2005).
Method
Participants—Twenty-four undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill participated for course credit. All were native English speakers with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve about the research goals.
Stimuli—Experimental stimuli consisted of triplets of object and animal names selected
from size-rating norms for animal (Dean et al., 2005) and object names (Holyoak et al.,
1979). Objects and animals were selected with two constraints: (1) Across items there was a
substantial range in rated size that was evenly distributed so that approximately equal
numbers of items could be placed in each of three size groups (small, medium and large),
and (2) the average standard deviation in size ratings for an item was low, indicating that
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size representations were similar across raters. Cross-individual consistency in size estimates
was further validated by examining the reliability of ratings for the 21 animal names that
were normed in both Dean et al. and Holyoak et al. Although the two studies used different
rating scales, had different rating instructions, and were collected more than twenty years
apart, the two sets of norms were highly correlated, r = .96, p < .001, R2 = .91.
The stimulus triplets were constructed as follows. Twenty-one animal names referring to
animals across a range of sizes served as targets appearing in the middle position of a triplet,
while the remaining 25 animal names served as flankers. Triplets were constructed so that
the semantic size difference between the first and the second animal was small (about 1
target standard deviation), medium (about 2 target standard deviations) or large (3 or more
target standard deviations). In addition, the first item was either larger or smaller than the
target item, so that there were an equal number of ascending and descending triplets,
resulting in a 3(size difference) × 2(direction of the size difference) within-subjects design.
The third word in the triplet was added so that for half of the trials, the size of the middle
animal was in between the size of the two outer animals, resulting in a “consistent” triplet
(e.g. eagle – cow – elephant). On the other half of the trials, the size of the middle item was
not in between the two outer items, resulting in an “inconsistent” triplet (e.g. giraffe – cow –
elephant). The same procedure was followed for the object triplets, using 21 target and 37
flanker objects. The greater number of flanker items for objects as compared to animals was
possible because Holyoak et al. (1979) supplied more items that fit our criteria than did
Dean et al. (2005). Flanker items were chosen so as to minimize repetition of flanker items
within blocks. See Appendix A for a sample of our experimental stimuli.
A norming study was conducted to measure the semantic relatedness of all the word pairs
occurring within the triplets. Thirty participants were presented with the pairs one at a time
and asked to rate the association between the items in the pair (“Indicate the degree to which
you feel these two items are associated. For example, how often do you think of the two
items together, do they occur together in the real world, or are they mentioned in the same
context?”), answering on a scale of 1 (not at all associated) to 7 (entirely associated). The
order of the words in each pair was counterbalanced across participants. None of the
participants in the norming study took part in any of the eye-tracking experiments reported
here. Overall, the pairs were rated low on semantic relatedness, with a mean rating of 2.52
for small difference pairs (SD = .62), 2.48 for medium difference pairs (SD = .62) and 2.18
for large difference pairs (SD = .53). The slight difference in mean similarity ratings for
pairs with small and medium size differences was significant by subjects but not by items,
t1(29) = 2.82, p = .009, d = .51; t2(41) = .32, p = .749. For pairs with medium and large size
differences, the difference in similarity ratings was significant, t1(29) = 8.50, p < .001, d =
1.55; t2(41) = 2.65, p = .011, d = .41. Previous research on semantic or associative priming
suggests that words are processed more quickly when preceded by a semantically related or
associated prime (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). Therefore, if the results of the experiment
show reduced reading times for pairs within the small or medium size difference condition
compared to the large size difference condition, it will be important to distinguish between
effects caused by the size difference manipulation and differences in semantic relatedness.
Target items were counterbalanced across six lists, each consisting of six blocks of 42 trials,
resulting in 252 trials per participant. In each block, all target words appeared once in
random order, with animal and object triplets randomly intermixed. Unlike the targets,
flanker items were occasionally repeated within blocks. Across the blocks within a list, each
word appeared once in each condition, so that all participants saw each target in each
condition, resulting in a total of six differently primed presentations of each target word. To
control for possible effects of target repetition, each list started with a different block. Each
experimental session started with twelve warm-up trials, which did not contain any of the
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target words used in the experimental trials. The warm-up trials were excluded from all
analyses. To make sure participants fully understood the task, they were also presented with
several practice triplets verbally by the experimenter before they were set up for eye-
tracking.
Procedure—Eye movements were recorded from the participants’ right eye using an SR
EyeLink 1000. Stimuli were presented on a 20 inch ViewSonic G225f Monitor at a distance
of 61 cm with a display resolution of 1024 × 768. At the beginning of each session the
tracker was calibrated using a 9-point procedure; calibration was checked between trials and
the tracker was recalibrated when necessary. Participants sat in a well-lit room with a chin
and a forehead rest minimizing their head movements. They were instructed to read the
triplets silently and decide for each triplet whether the size of the middle object or animal
was in between the two outer (first and last) objects or animals. Participants answered by
indicating “yes” or “no,” using a handheld console. The experimenter monitored eye
movements throughout the session.
Each trial started with a fixation point placed on the left side of the screen on the horizontal
axis. Once this point was fixated, the next screen appeared, with the first word of the triplet
slightly to the right of the fixation point. The middle and last word appeared in the center
and on the right side of the screen on the same horizontal axis, masked by hash marks. Gaze-
contingent invisible boundaries were placed approximately 120 pixels to the left of the
middle and last word’s mask. Gaze contingencies were set up so that each word was visible
only when the eyes entered the word’s region from left to right, and was no longer visible
after the eyes left its region to the right (see Figure 1). This method of stimulus presentation
prevented potential parafoveal preview or rereading of the first and middle word. When the
participants moved their gaze across the invisible boundary between the first and middle
word, the middle word was unmasked and the first word was masked. The same event was
repeated when the eyes crossed the invisible boundary between the middle and last word, so
that the middle word was masked and the third word unmasked. Once the eyes left the first
or middle word to the right, these items did not become visible again upon regressive eye-
movements. The last word remained visible until a response was made. Participants received
feedback on their accuracy after every trial.
Analysis of eye movements—Fixations shorter than 80 ms and within 1 degree of a
longer, immediately subsequent fixation were merged with the longer fixation by an
automatic procedure in the Eyelink software.
Following Brysbaert (1995), gaze duration on the middle word was taken as a measure of
encoding time for this item, reflecting encoding-based activation of word properties. Gaze
duration is the average of the sum of all first-pass fixation durations on a word and is widely
used as a measure of lexical encoding in eye-tracking studies of reading (Inhoff, 1984;
Morris, 1994; Rayner, 1998). Secondary analyses of encoding time were also performed
using first-fixation duration (the duration of the first fixation on a word regardless of
whether the word receives other first-pass fixations) and single fixation duration (the
duration of the first fixation on a word on those trials where the word only receives one first-
pass fixation). These latter two measures potentially reflect earlier processes than does gaze
duration, but their interpretation can be problematic. First-fixation duration depends
systematically on whether the word receives subsequent first-pass fixations. Single-fixation
duration measures performance only on a subset of trials and is most meaningful when a
high proportion of trials receive single fixations. In addition to these standard eye-tracking
measures, Decision Time was defined as the time from the onset of the third word until the
button press indicating a response, reflecting goal-based activation. We also computed
Middle-Last Ratio, which was the gaze duration of the middle word over the decision time.
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This provided a measure of the proportion of time spent on the middle word compared to the
time spent on the last word and the task-decision on each trial.
Results and Discussion
The detailed data analyses reported below are based on the first three blocks performed by
each participant. This is done to allow close comparison to the results of Experiment 3,
where the addition of another task meant that only three blocks of data could be obtained in
this part of the experiment. Analyses of all six blocks in Experiment 1 showed very similar
patterns of results and all effects of interest remained significant1. Overall accuracy was
87%, and no participant had an average accuracy below 71%. Inaccurate trials were
excluded from all analyses involving response time measures, but not middle word encoding
time, as gaze duration does not measure task-related responses that can be evaluated for
accuracy.
Mean correct decision times are shown in the left panel of Figure 2. They showed a strong
symbolic distance effect, with times decreasing as the difference in semantic size between
the first and middle word increased, F1(1,23) = 24.4, p <.001, partial η2 = .52; F2(1,41) =
17.8, p < .001, η2 = .30, for the linear effect of size difference. There was no difference in
decision times between ascending and descending trials, F1(1,23) = 3.1, p = .09; F2(1,41) =
2.2, p = .148, though there was a marginally significant tendency for the effect of size
difference to be stronger for descending than ascending trials, F1(1,23) = 4.5, p < .05, partial
η2 = .16; F2(1,41) = 2.6, p = .117. Decision times were faster for consistent trials (requiring
a ‘yes’ response, M = 2049 ms) than for inconsistent trials (requiring a ‘no’ response, M =
2241 ms), F1(1,23) = 10.43, p < .01, partial η2 = .31 ; F2(1,41) = 10.39, p < .01, partial η2
= .21. Consistency did not interact with size difference, F1(1,23) = 1.1, p = .296; F2(1,41)
= .54, p = .467.
Mean accuracy rates followed the same pattern as decision times, with accuracy increasing
as the difference in semantic size between the first and middle word increased from small
(M = .83), to medium (M = .88) and to large (M = .91),, F1(1,23) = 16.7, p <.001, η2 = .43;
F2(1,41) = 21.0, p <.001, η2 = .34, for the linear effect of size difference.
Only 34% of trials consisted of a single fixation, and for this reason analyses of encoding
time focus on gaze duration2. As shown in the right panel of Figure 2, middle word
encoding times also showed a symbolic distance effect, such that mean encoding time on the
middle word was shorter when the semantic size difference between the first and middle
word was larger, F1(1,23) = 11.7, p < .01, partial η2 = .34 ; F2(1,41) = 6.0, p < .02, partial η2
= .13, for the linear effect of size difference. Middle word encoding time did not show a
difference between ascending and descending trials, F1(1,23) = .2 p = .663; F2(1,41) = .002,
p = .969, nor was there an interaction between size difference and direction of the
difference, F1(1,23) = .2, p = .674, F2(1,41) = 1.0, p = .343. Observation of a symbolic
1For all six blocks of Experiment 1 mean accuracy was 88%. There was a significant linear effect of symbolic distance effect on
decision times, F1(1,23) = 36.7, p < .001, partial η2 = .62 ; F2(1,41) = 27.6, p < .001, η2 = .40 and on accuracy rates, F1(1,23) = 40.4,
p <.001, η2 = .64 ; F2(1,41) = 23.2, p <.001, η2 = .36.
Mean encoding times also showed a significant linear effect of size difference, F1(1,23) = 7.7, p = .011, partial η2 = .25; F2(1,41) =
21.2, p < .001, partial η2 = .34. Mean participant middle-last ratios ranged from .11 to 1.05. There was a negative correlation between
the middle-last ratio and the slopes of their size-difference effects: r = −.67, p < .001, R2 = .44. Middle-last ratio was not related to
total trial completion time: r = .12 p = .623, but use of an incremental strategy correlated positively with accuracy: r = .51, p < .02, R2
= .26. The 50 percent of participants with the lowest middle-last ratios (M = .25) showed no significant effect of size difference on
encoding time: F1(1,11) = 1.2, p = .302; F2(1,41) = .64, p = .430 (n = 12). The 50 percent of participants with the highest middle-last
ratios (M = .63) showed robust symbolic distance effects on encoding time, F1(1,11) = 8.7, p < .02, η2 = .44; F2(1,41) = 23.2, p < .
001, η2 =.36 (n = 12).
2First fixation duration did not show a significant effect in any of the experiments reported here. No effects of single fixation duration
were significant in Experiment 1.
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distance effect on the middle words shows that the effect of size difference on encoding time
for words was the opposite of the distance-priming effect that Brysbaert (1995) found for
numbers. This pattern does not support encoding-based activation of size information, which
we have argued leads to the prediction that distance priming should be observed for
encoding times. The surprising finding of a symbolic distance effect on encoding times is
analyzed below in relation to individual differences in strategies for performing the triplet
comparison task.
Variation in individual strategies—Our analysis plan followed Brysbaert (1995) in
operationalizing encoding time as gaze duration on the middle word, an approach that is
consistent with practice in the reading literature where systematic effects of lexical
properties on gaze duration have led to its being considered a primary measure of word
recognition (Inhoff, 1984; Morris, 1994; Rayner, 1998). The finding that gaze duration on
the middle word showed a symbolic distance effect indicates that for this task gaze duration
may reflect both lexical encoding and goal-driven processing. This possibility was tested by
examining whether the magnitude of a participant’s symbolic distance effect on encoding
time for the middle word was related to his or her judgment strategy. The magnitude of the
symbolic distance effect on encoding time was given by the slope of the linear effect of size
difference between the first and middle words on middle-word gaze duration encoding time.
More negative slopes indicate stronger symbolic distance effects, while a slope of zero
indicates no distance effect and a positive slope would indicate distance priming. Judgment
strategy was given by the a participant’s middle-last ratio, defined as the participant’s
average encoding time on the middle word divided by his or her average decision time on
correct trials. Mean participant middle-last ratios ranged from .12 to .99. High ratios indicate
that the participant spent a relatively long time encoding the middle word compared to the
time spent on the last word until the response indicating a decision, a pattern that is
consistent with the use of an incremental-judgment strategy where the semantic size of the
middle word is mentally compared to that of the first word before the eyes move on to the
final word. Lower ratios indicate long decision times relative to middle word encoding
times, a pattern that is consistent with the use of a final-judgment strategy where mental
comparison of sizes is postponed until the last word is seen.
The scatterplot in Figure 3 shows that the magnitude of a participant’s symbolic distance
effect on encoding time was strongly related to his or her judgment strategy, with larger
symbolic distance effects observed for participants pursuing an incremental-judgment
strategy than for those pursuing a final-judgment strategy. This conclusion is supported by a
robust negative correlation between participants’ middle-last ratios and the slopes of their
size-difference effects, r = −.71, p < .001, R2 = .50. Judgment strategy, as measured by
middle-last ratio, was not related to overall speed measured by total time for trial
completion, r = .12, p = .593. However, subject middle-last ratio was related to overall
accuracy, with use of an incremental strategy showing a positive correlation with mean
accuracy in the task, r = .49, p <.02, R2 = .237. This supports the idea that individual
participant strategies not only affect the extent to which participants exhibit the symbolic
distance effect on the middle word, but also their level of task performance.
The scatterplot in Figure 3 also provides evidence about whether use of an incremental
judgment strategy may have caused distance priming for the second word to be masked by
mental comparison processes that occurred while the participant looked at the second word.
If that were the case, then it would be expected that participant’s using a final-judgment
strategy (indicated by a low middle-last ratio) might show distance priming, rather than the
symbolic distance effect, on middle-word encoding time. Examination of performance for
participants using a final-judgment strategy, shown toward the left in Figure 3, suggests that
this was not the case. The slopes of the size-difference effect for these participants appear to
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be randomly distributed around zero, rather than showing a preponderance of positive slopes
of the sort that would be associated with distance-priming effects. Statistical support for this
conclusion comes from the absence of a significant effect of size difference on encoding
time (middle-word gaze duration) for the 50 percent of participants with the lowest middle-
last ratios (M = .21), F1(1,11) = 2.7, p = .132; F2(1,41) = .84, p = .365 (n = 12). The 50
percent of participants with the highest middle-last ratios (M = .56) showed robust symbolic
distance effects on encoding time, F1(1,11) = 12.5, p < .01, η2 = .53; F2(1,41) = 10.6, p < .
01, η2 = .21 (n = 12).
This experiment showed robust symbolic distance effects on decision times across
participants, and on encoding times for those participants using an incremental-judgment
strategy. Because the symbolic distance effect reflects difficulty of comparing the size of
objects that are close in size, these effects support the idea that size information associated
with lexical items was activated by the goal of size comparison. The experiment provided no
evidence of distance priming as would be expected if size information were automatically
activated during lexical encoding.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 did not show a size-based priming effect of the sort that would
be expected if activation of semantic size occurs during lexical encoding of object and
animal names in the same way that Brysbaert (1995) showed that it did for numerals.
However, the results did show comparison-based activation of size information both on
decision time and on middle-word encoding time, with the analysis of judgment strategy
suggesting that the absence of distance priming was not due to masking by the symbolic
distance effect. The current experiment examines whether distance priming between
successive object and animal names is found when the task demands do not involve the
semantic size of the referents. It uses Brysbaert’s memory paradigm, where participants read
three words as in Experiment 1 but then judged whether a subsequently presented probe
word had been among the preceding triplet. Brysbaert found numerical distance priming in
this task even though the magnitude of the numbers was not relevant to performing the task.
This provided evidence that the magnitude of numbers is activated automatically upon
encoding even if magnitude is not relevant to task goals. Examination of whether size-based
priming is found for object and animal names in this task provides a further test of whether
there is encoding-based activation of semantic size that may perhaps have been masked by
comparison processes in Experiment 1.
Method
Participants—Twenty-four undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill participated for course credit. All were native English speakers with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve about the research goals. None had participated
in Experiment 1.
Stimuli & Procedure—The object and animal names, as well as the mode of presentation,
were identical to those used in Experiment 1. However, participants were instructed to move
their gaze to a mask at the bottom-center of the screen after reading the third word in each
triplet. Once fixated, the mask was removed to reveal a fourth word. On half of the trials, the
fourth word had been among that trial’s triplet, while on the other half it was new (but could
have appeared earlier in the experiment on one or more different trials). The participants’
task was to indicate whether the probe had been among the triplet or not, indicating ‘yes’ or
‘no’ on a hand-held console. The first, middle and last word of the triplet appeared as ‘old’
probes equally often. No words of the triplet were visible on the screen after the onset of the
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probe. The probe remained visible until a response was made. Participants received accuracy
feedback after each trial.
After completing the experiment, participants were given a questionnaire with increasingly
specific questions checking for any awareness of the size difference manipulation.
Analysis of eye movements—Eye movements were analyzed as in Experiment 1.
Middle-last ratios were not computed since the triplet and the probe were not considered to
take part in the same task process. Due to a stimulus error .9% of all trials were excluded.
Results and Discussion
Detailed results are presented for the first three blocks only as in Experiment 13. Overall
accuracy across participants was 97%, with no participant scoring below 92% accuracy.
Inaccurate trials were excluded from all analyses involving fixations on the last word or the
probe and response time measures.
Sixty-two percent of trials had only a single fixation, so both single-fixation duration and
gaze duration were considered as measures of encoding time. Neither measure showed
significant variation as a function of the distance in semantic size of the middle word from
the initial one. Average single-fixation durations as a function of distance were 215 ms
(small), 216 ms (medium) and 212 ms (large), F1(1,23) = 1.0, p = .305; F2(1,41) = .44 p = .
512. Average gaze durations were 242 ms (small), 247 ms (medium) and 243 ms (large), F1
(1,23) = .07, p = .788, F2(1,41) = .02, p = .896. Encoding times also did not vary as a
function of the direction of the difference between the first and middle words on either
measure F1(1,23) < 1; F2(1,41) <1, nor was there a significant interaction between size
difference and the direction of the difference, F1(1,23) = 1.6, p = .213; F2(1,41) = 2.7, p = .
110.
The null effect of size difference on middle-word encoding time was found for a measure
that was used by Brysbaert (1995) to show distance priming with numbers and which has
been widely used as a measure of lexical access as well as semantic integration in studies of
reading (Inhoff, 1984; Morris, 1994; Rayner, 1998). In order to show that reading time on
the middle word was a sensitive measure of lexical encoding in this experiment, we
investigated its relation to word length (number of letters) and word frequency
(SUBTLEXus, Brysbaert & New, 2009), factors that are strongly related to ease of lexical
encoding and known to affect fixation duration during reading of continuous text for
comprehension (Rayner, 1998). Multiple-regression analyses showed that on the middle-
word, single-fixation duration was strongly related to word length and frequency, r = .73,
R2= .532, F(2,39) = 22.2, p < .001 (see Figure 4); word length significantly predicted single
fixation duration, β = .42, p < .01, as did the log of word frequency per 51 million, β = −.40,
p < .01. A consistent but statistically weaker relation was found with gaze duration. Neither
word length nor word frequency interacted with size difference.
In sum, this experiment showed that while reading time on the middle word was related to
ease of lexical encoding, it provided no evidence of distance priming as would be expected
if there were encoding-based activation of semantic size for object and animal names. This
suggests that meaningful encoding of words is affected by statistical properties of words as
linguistic symbols, such as word frequency, but not visuospatial properties like semantic
3For all six blocks of Experiment 2 mean accuracy was 97%. No effect of size difference was found on gaze duration F1(1,23) = .3, p
= .568; F2(1,41) = .2, p = .646 or single fixation duration, all Fs <1. Middle-word, single-fixation duration was strongly related to
word length and frequency, r = .77, R2 = .60, F(2,39) = 28.6, p < .001. Neither word length nor word frequency interacted with size
difference.
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size. However, previous results on numerical distance priming show that numerical symbols
do elicit activation of magnitude information upon encoding (Brysbaert, 1995).
Experiment 3
Neither Experiment 1 nor Experiment 2 provided any evidence of distance priming in the
processing of animal and object names, though Experiment 1 showed very robust symbolic
distance effects for these words. This pattern supports the conclusion that representations of
semantic size are not automatically activated as part of encoding these items but that
activation follows instead from the processes required to achieve task goals. In contrast,
research on numerals has consistently shown distance priming (Brysbaert, 1995; Den Heyer
& Briand, 1986; Marcel & Forrin, 1974; Reynvoet et al., 2002) and symbolic distance
effects (Brysbaert, 1995; Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Koechlin et al., 1999; Moyer & Landauer,
1967; Van Opstal et al., 2008), a pattern indicating that representations of semantic size for
numerals are automatically activated during encoding and that the use of those
representations is influenced by task goals. In Experiment 3 the size-order judgment task of
Experiment 1 (Brysbaert, 1995, Experiment 1) is used with both word and number trials in
order to determine whether this difference in how semantic size is activated for words and
Arabic numerals can be demonstrated in the same experiment.
Method
Participants—Twenty-four undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill participated for course credit. All were native English speakers with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve about the research goals. None had participated
in Experiment 1 or 2.
Stimuli—The animal and object triplets were identical to those in Experiment 1. However,
to allow for the addition of the number block while keeping the testing session under forty-
five minutes each participant was presented with each target three times, once in each size
condition, rather than six times as in Experiment 1. Thus, a participant saw each item-by-
size combination either in an ascending or a descending triplet, but not in both. This resulted
in a total of 126 animal and object trials per participant. This is equivalent to the first 3
blocks of data which were reported for Experiment 1. The trials were presented in random
order.
The number triplets were constructed by having each Arabic numeral between 14 and 97
presented as a target (middle) number once, resulting in 76 trials per participant. The first
and last numbers were selected so that the numerical difference between the target and the
flankers was between 1 and 19. The direction of the difference between the first and middle
number was either ascending or descending, and the third number was chosen so that the
triplet was either consistent (e.g. 24 – 26 – 31) or inconsistent (e.g. 24– 26 – 25),
counterbalanced across four lists. Each list contained each target number once, with
consistent/inconsistent and ascending/descending trials appearing equally often. Similarly,
each numerical difference between 1 and 19 appeared approximately equally often per list.
Each subject saw one list, preceded by eight warm-up trials which were excluded from all
analyses. The number trials were presented in a separate block from the word trials, and the
presentation order of these blocks was counterbalanced across participants so that half of the
participants started with the number block and then completed the word block while the
other half of the participants started with the word block and then completed the number
block.
Procedure—The stimulus presentation and eye-tracking procedures were the same as in
Experiment 1 with one exception. Whereas in Experiment 1 the first word of the triplet
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appeared in place of the fixation point, in Experiment 3 the fixation point and the three
words were each placed on a separate vertical quarter of the screen. This allowed for more
reliable measurement of the reading time on the first word, as the appearance of all three
words in the triplet was triggered in the same way. A gaze-contingent invisible boundary
was placed to the right of the fixation point and 80 pixels from the left boundary of the first
word. Once the fixation point was fixated and the trial started, all three words appeared to
the right of the fixation point masked by hash marks, with 240 pixels between the left
boundaries of the masks. Gaze-contingent invisible boundaries were placed 80 pixels from
the left boundary of each mask in the triplet, preventing preview and rereading of any of the
words before entering and after exiting the word’s region.
As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to indicate whether the size of the middle
animal or object was in between the size of the two outer items. For the number trials, the
task was to indicate whether the middle number was in between the two outer numbers. All
responses were made by pressing ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on a hand-held console.
There was a short break between the number and word blocks, and the eye tracker was
recalibrated for all participants between the two blocks.
Analysis of eye movements—Eye movements were analyzed as in Experiment 1.
Results
Two participants whose accuracy score was below 57% on one portion of the experiment
were excluded from both sets of analyses and replaced. Comparing accuracy and total trial
time for the number and object-animal portion of the experiment indicates that the task was
easier to perform with numbers than with object and animal names. Overall accuracy was
higher for the number (93%) than for the word portion of the experiment (89%): F(1,23) =
12.0, p < .01, η2 = .34, and mean total trial time was faster for the numbers (M = 2348 ms)
than the object-animal names (M = 3590 ms): F(1,23) = 58.0, p < .001, η2 = .72. For both
the word and number tasks, inaccurate trials were excluded from all reading time analyses
involving response time measures, but not analysis of the middle word encoding times.
Reading time results for the word and number blocks are discussed separately below.
Object and animal names—Mean decision times of correct decisions are shown in the
top, left panel of Figure 5. As in Experiment 1, they showed a strong symbolic distance
effect, with times decreasing as the difference in semantic size between the first and middle
word increased, F1(1,23) = 31.1, p < .001, partial η2 = .58 ; F2(1,41) = 25.5, p < .001, η2 = .
38, for the linear effect of size difference. There was no significant difference in decision
times between ascending and descending trials, F1(1,23) = 3.9, p = .061; F2(1,41) = 3.4 p = .
072, though there was a tendency for the effect of size difference to be stronger for
descending than ascending trials, F1(1,23) = 8.1, p < .01, partial η2 = .26 ; F2(1,41) = 5.0, p
< .05, partial η2 = .12. Decision times were faster for consistent than inconsistent trials,
F1(1,23) = 9.9, p < .01, partial η2 = .3 ; F2(1,41) = 14.1, p < .01, partial η2 = .26, but the
interaction between consistency and size difference was not significant, F1(1,23) = 1.1, p = .
299; F2(1,41) = .9, p = .362.
As in Experiment 1, mean accuracy rates showed a symbolic distance effect similar to the
decision times. Mean accuracy increased as the difference in semantic size between the first
and middle word increased from small (M = .85), to medium (M = .90) and to large (M = .
91), F1(1,23) = 9.3, p < .01, η2 = .29; F2(1,41) = 19.5, p <.001, η2 = .32, for the linear effect
of size difference.
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Only 32% of trials consisted of a single fixation and for this reason analyses of encoding
time focus on gaze duration4. As shown in the top-right panel of Figure 5, encoding time on
the middle word also showed a symbolic distance effect, such that mean gaze durations on
the middle word decreased as the difference between the middle and first word increased,
F1(1,23) = 9.5, p < .01, partial η2 = .29; F2(1,41) = 7.4, p < .02, partial η2 = .15. Middle-
word encoding time did not differ significantly for ascending and descending trials, F1(1,23)
= .04, p = .850; F2(1,41) = .1, p = .745, nor was there an interaction between size difference
and direction of the difference, F1(1,23) = .06; p = .804, F2(1,41) = .4, p = .556.
These results for the word portion of Experiment 3 replicate Experiment 1 on all measures
of interest.
Variation in individual strategies for animal and object names—Analysis of
variation in participants’ task strategies was assessed as in Experiment 1 by examining the
relationship between middle-last ratio and symbolic distance effect slopes on encoding time.
Individuals’ mean middle-last ratios ranged from .12 to .93. Figure 6 shows that there was a
strong negative correlation between participants’ middle-last ratio on correct trials and the
slopes of their size-distance effects, r = −.65, p < .01, R2 = .43, just as there was in
Experiment 1. Individuals with higher ratios showed more negative encoding time slopes,
indicating a stronger effect of size difference. Consistent with Experiment 1, judgment
strategy, as measured by middle-last ratio, was not related to overall speed as measured by
total time for trial completion, r = −.12, p = .616. In contrast to Experiment 1, where higher
middle-last ratios were significantly related to overall accuracy, this relationship was not
significant in Experiment 2, r = .33, p = .122. However, the results of one participant were
very different from the general pattern, as this person had both the lowest decision ratio (.12)
and the highest accuracy rate (1.0). When this outlier was removed there was a significant
correlation between middle-last ratio and accuracy that was numerically similar to the one
found in Experiment 1, r = .49, p < .02, R2 = .240. Removal of this participant’s data caused
little change in the critical relationship between encoding time slope and middle-last ratio, r
= −.64, p < .01, R2 = .412.
As in Experiment 1, the 50% of participants with the lowest middle-last ratios (M = .27) did
not show a significant effect of size difference on encoding time, F1(1,11) = .13, p = .726;
F2(1,41) = .03, p = .855, while the 50% of participants with the highest middle-last ratios (M
= .63) showed a significant effect on this measure, F1(1,11) = 14.2, p < .01, η2 = .56 ;
F2(1,41) = 7.1, p < .02, η2 = .15.
These results on strategy effects for the word portion of Experiment 3 replicate those from
Experiment 1 on all measures of interest.
Numbers—Whereas the design of the object-animal names study used three categories of
size difference (small, medium, large), the difference in size for the numbers varied
continuously from one to nineteen. Accordingly, the effects of size difference were analyzed
using regression rather than ANOVA, with times regressed on the log of size difference
because of evidence that the mental number line is logarithmic (Shepard, Kilpatric &
Cunningham, 1975; Dehaene, 2003). Trials on which the first and last number were identical
(6.2% of the trials) were excluded from all analyses involving decision time and accuracy
measures as were trials where decision times were more than three standard deviations
above the grand mean (2.4% of correct trials).
4Single fixation duration did not show any significant effects. All Fs < 2.1.
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As seen in the bottom-left panel of Figure 5, average correct decision times decreased with
the log of the difference between the middle and final numerals, r = .88, R2= .77, F(1,17) =
58.1, p < .001. The generality across participants of this symbolic distance effect on decision
times was further assessed by fitting the regression model to each participant’s data
individually. The slope parameters calculated this way were significantly less than zero (M
= −51.1), t(23) = −3.1, p < .01, d = .64. Decision times were faster for consistent triplets
(1051 ms) than inconsistent triplets (1196 ms), F(1,23) = 20.5, p < .001, η2 = .47 and the
effect of size difference on decision time was greater for consistent sequences than for
inconsistent sequences, t(23) = 4.6, p < .001, d = .95.
Forty-five percent of trials consisted of a single fixation so analyses of encoding time focus
on gaze duration. As seen in the bottom-right panel of Figure 5, average encoding times for
the middle number increased with the log of the difference between the first and middle
numerals, r = .63, R2 = .40, F(1,17) = 11.3, p < .01. The generality across participants of this
distance priming effect on encoding times was significant in a test of the slope parameters
obtained from fitting the regression model to participants’ data individually, (M = 39.3),
t(23) = 2.44, p < .05, d = .50. Encoding times were slightly faster for ascending (565 ms)
than descending (605 ms) trials, F(1,23) = 5.5, p < .05, partial η2 = .19, but the direction of
the difference did not interact with size difference: t(23) = −1.95 p = .064. Size difference
between the middle and final numeral did not systematically affect mean accuracy rates, r = .
29, F(1,17) = 1.5, p = .237.
These results support both encoding- and goal-based activation of numerical magnitude. At
the number-meaning level of comprehension, encoding-based activation results in a
numerical distance priming effect on encoding times. At the task-level of comprehension,
goal-based activation of numerical magnitude results in a symbolic distance effect on the
comparison decision times.
Variation in individual strategies for numbers—Individual participant strategies
were assessed the same as in Experiment 1 and the word portion of Experiment 3, using
middle-last ratios computed by taking the encoding time on the middle word over the
decision time. Participants’ mean middle-last ratios on correct number trials ranged from .20
to 1.10. In addition, the strength of the numerical distance priming effect for each individual
was calculated by taking the slope of encoding time as a function of the numerical distance
between the middle and first number, so that more positive slopes indicated stronger priming
effects. Whereas individual strategies were related to the strength of the symbolic distance
effect on encoding times for the object and animal names, individual participant strategies
did not uniformly affect the strength of the numerical distance priming effect as there was no
relationship between the subject’s mean middle-last ratio and their encoding time slope: r = .
26, p = .213.
Judgment strategy, as measured by middle-last ratio, was related to overall speed, with use
of an incremental judgment strategy showing a positive correlation with average time
needed to complete each trial: r = .60, p < .01, R2 = .36. This is in contrast with results on
object and animal names in Experiment 1 and the word portion of Experiment 3, where
decision ratio was not related to overall speed. This suggests that individuals with an
incremental judgment strategy for the numbers generally processed numerical stimuli more
slowly than individuals with a final judgment strategy.
Middle-last ratio was not related to accuracy: r = .23, p = .283. Again, this result is in
contrast with Experiment 1 and the word portion of Experiment 3 once we removed one
participant outlier, in which higher middle-last ratios were related to better task
performance.
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The results Experiment 3 support our earlier results showing that representations of the size
of objects and animals are not automatically activated during lexical encoding of their
names, but rather that size information is activated for the comparison processes necessary
to achieve task goals. Further, this pattern contrasts with that found for Arabic numerals,
where representations of semantic size are automatically activated during encoding and
where the use of those representations is also influenced by task goals. These conclusions
are supported by the finding that object and animal names do not show a distance priming
effect but do show a symbolic distance effect, while numerals show distance priming early
in processing and a symbolic distance effect later in processing as previously demonstrated
by Brysbaert (1995).
Analyses of individual differences in task strategies provide further evidence that semantic
size is activated in different ways for object-animal names and for Arabic numerals. The two
types of stimuli lead to similar variation in middle-last ratio, a measure of the time spent on
the middle word or number relative to the time spent on making the decision after seeing the
final word or numeral. However, the characteristics of performance associated with this
variation in task strategies differ for the two types of stimuli. For object and animal names, a
high middle-last ratio was associated with showing a symbolic distance effect on encoding
time for the middle word, with higher accuracy and no increase in overall trial time. This
suggests that participants showing high middle-last ratios made use of an incremental-
judgment strategy that involved comparing the semantic size of the middle and first items
before encoding and comparing the final item. This strategy is efficient in that it increased
accuracy without increasing overall time to complete the trial. For numerals, variation in
middle-last ratio was not related to the magnitude of distance priming during encoding of
the middle number, nor was it related to performance accuracy. However, high middle-last
ratios were associated with slower trial times.
Differences in the meanings associated with animal-object names and numerals suggest a
reason why there are differences in the use of semantic size information for these two types
of symbols. Many different types of semantic properties are associated with object and
animal names. Automatically activating all of those meanings upon encoding a word may be
impossible or inefficient. Accordingly, semantic size information is only activated by
processes that are specifically related to task goals, in this case comparison of the size of
successive items. Use of an incremental-judgment strategy is efficient because activation of
the size information is difficult, making it problematic to engage in a final-judgment strategy
where activation and comparison of size information is postponed until all three items have
been encoded. In contrast, because little meaning beyond semantic size is inherently
associated with numerals, semantic size information may be automatically activated upon
encoding. Such easy, automatic activation eliminates any processing advantage of an
incremental-judgment strategy relative to a final-judgment strategy where the activated size
representations for the three items can be evaluated with respect to the task demand of
determining whether the middle number is in between the outer ones. For this reason greater
time spent looking at the middle item is not efficient and is associated with longer overall
trial times.
Comparison of overall performance in the numeral and animal-object tasks provides further
support for the notion that activation of size information is much easier for numerals than for
animals and objects. As noted above, average completion times and error rates were
substantially lower for numeral stimuli than for animal and object stimuli. It seems that
semantic size information rides for free with numerals but not with words referring to
concrete objects.
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The three experiments reported here examined the way in which semantic size is activated
and used to make judgments. They did so by measuring looking times and decision times as
participants made judgments about three symbols (words or Arabic numerals) displayed on a
screen. A gaze-contingent display technique was used so that participants only received
visual information about each of the symbols during first-pass fixations on the region of the
screen containing the symbol. This technique tightens the association between looking time
and encoding time by preventing parafoveal preview and rereading (Brysbaert, 1995).
Experiment 1 showed that decision times in a three-item, size-order judgment task increased
as the distance in the semantic size of the referents of successive animal or object names
decreased. This symbolic distance effect was also observed on encoding time for
participants who adopted an incremental-judgment strategy of comparing the size of the first
two items before proceeding to encoding of the third item. This pattern indicates that
semantic size of the referent was activated in a goal-driven manner by the mental processes
for comparing the size of the referents. Experiment 1 provided no evidence of distance
priming (reduction of encoding time when the preceding referent was close in size); an
effect that would have indicated that semantic size was activated automatically during
encoding. Experiment 2 used a memory-probe task rather than an order-judgment task but
also found no evidence of distance priming within the three-item sequences. If the task goal
of size comparison had masked distance priming due to encoding-based activation in
Experiment 1, then the absence of any size-related task goal should have unmasked the
distance-priming effect. Experiment 3 replicated the pattern seen in Experiment 1 for animal
and object names, indicating goal-driven activation of size representations but no automatic
activation of size representations during lexical encoding. In addition, it showed that size
representations were activated both in a goal-driven manner and automatically during
encoding when the items in the sequence were Arabic numerals rather than words referring
to concrete objects. This contrast between words and numerals suggests that size
information is automatically activated on encoding when size is the dominant if not sole
meaning of a symbol, as for numerals, but that it is not automatically activated on encoding
symbols, such as words, that have many associated meanings.
The pattern of results for words in these experiments is not consistent with predictions
derived from accounts of language comprehension as an embodied process that is
fundamentally based on perceptual simulation. Models of this sort, such as perceptual
symbol systems (Barsalou, 1999) or the immersed experiencer framework (Zwaan, 2004),
propose that language comprehension entails reactivation of the information associated with
the perceptual experience of the word’s referent. If reactivation of perceptual experience is a
necessary part of language comprehension, then distance-priming should have been
observed during encoding. However, our results suggest that words are encoded without
such perceptual reactivation and that semantic size representations are activated in a goal-
driven manner by processes necessary for successful task performance.
In contrast, numbers do appear to function as perceptual symbols. While language-
processing goals guide the flexible use of different representational forms associated with
the meaning of linguistic symbols, magnitude information associated with numerical
symbols can be characterized as foundational to the representation of number meaning and
showing a general priority in processing. This difference in the symbolic content activated
upon initial processing is likely due to differences in the complexity of meaning associated
with linguistic compared to numerical symbols. Arguably, analog magnitude defines the
meaning of a numerical symbol more efficiently than could any symbolic connection. The
meaning of linguistic symbols, on the other hand, may be more efficiently encoded as a
function of its connection to other linguistic symbols. After all, our primary experience with
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words is among other words, rather than in direct connection with the world. These
conclusions are supported by earlier demonstrations that language processing is affected by
perceptual features of referents primarily when that information facilitates task performance
(Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010; Louwerse & Connel, 2011; Kang et al., 2011).
Of course it is possible to counter that encoding a word leads to reactivation of some of the
perceptual properties of its referent but that priming was not observed for semantic size
because it was not a sufficiently important or salient property of the object or animal names.
Priming might have been observed for other different perceptual dimensions, such as color
or texture, that are more salient than size in general or that are particularly salient for some
set of objects. While this line of reasoning cannot be discounted completely, we believe that
it is not compelling. For the objects and animals that we studied, semantic size is a very
stable property of meaning, as demonstrated by the consistency of participants’ size ratings
across studies (Dean et al., 2005; Holyoak et al., 1979). Further, abundant demonstrations of
the symbolic distance effect (Banks & Flora, 1977; Dean et al., 2005; Holyoak, et al., 1979;
Moyer & Bayer, 1976) show that size comparisons for these words are made using the same
kind of analog representations that are used for numbers (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Koechlin
et al., 1999; Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Van Opstal et al., 2008) and for actual perceptual
stimuli (Johnson, 1939; Moyer & Bayer, 1976). The symbolic distance effect has long been
used to demonstrate an “internal psychophysics” (Moyer, 1973 p.183) where the relative
size of the referents is processed using representations that are akin to perceptual
representations. Accordingly, the characteristics of semantic size make it an excellent
property in which to look for reactivation of perceptual experience as a result of encoding
words.
It is also possible to counter that people create simulations rich enough to extract the
relevant aspects of the meaning of words without expending more cognitive effort than
strictly necessary (Gibbs & Perlman, 2010), or that the content of a simulation varies with
the context in which a concept is presented (Pecher, Zeelenberg & Barsalou, 2004), and that
therefore activation of perceptual properties is selective. Similarly, it has been suggested that
fast activation of linguistic symbols may be sufficient for tasks that rely on linguistic
associations, but that slower, more effortful activation of perceptual representations is
necessary for successful execution of tasks that require conceptual information (Barsalou,
Santos, Simmons & Wilson, 2008). These views readily account for the absence of distance
priming in Experiment 2, where the memory task made semantic size irrelevant, though it is
less clear how they would account for the results of Experiments 1 and 3, which explicitly
required use of semantic size. An optimal simulation of the word meanings for this task
certainly involves size information, yet there is no evidence of such a simulation during
encoding. This suggests that the activation of analog, modal representations is not what
constitutes language comprehension, or at least not exclusively. During encoding,
comprehension may rely on activation of abstract, propositional or perceptually
underspecified representations of word meaning, which in turn allow for activation of
context- or task-relevant aspects of word meaning.
Moreover, goal-driven activation of perceptual information during language comprehension
would fall under the weak (or conventional) form of embodied language processing, in
which the activation of embodied representations is possible and potentially very important,
but neither foundational to word meaning nor a mandatory component of word processing.
As we have argued, this weak form of embodied language does not differ from other
characterizations of language processing in a way that is problematic for either type of
approach. The goal-driven activation model can account for the observation of context-
dependent activation of perceptual information related to concepts by assuming flow of
activation between perceptual and non-perceptual systems according to goals associated
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with comprehension and task performance, without assuming that the conceptual
representation itself consists exclusively or primarily of sensorimotor information. This
contrasts with the strong (or radical) form of embodied language processing, in which
sensorimotor representations are considered to have general priority in processing.
The lack of an automatic connection between words and sensorimotor representations may
be exactly what allows our linguistic system to be such a powerful representational tool. As
noted earlier, words referring to concrete objects are part of a rich semantic space, which can
include category information, semantic associates and linguistic co-occurrence information
as well as a multifaceted perceptual representation. Based on the comprehension goals of the
reader, different aspects of this complex meaning space can be activated flexibly. While
explicit task demands provided the comprehension goals in the current studies, the goals that
guide comprehension during everyday language use are usually implicit. Some of these
goals may be implied by the demands of comprehension or conversation, while others may
be aimed at guiding action in the environment in real time, as discussed by proponents of
embodied cognition (Wilson, 2002). Close integration of perceptual and motor processes
with other cognitive processes, including language, increases the efficiency of action in the
environment, suggesting a substantial flow of goal-directed activation between linguistic,
perceptual and motor processes.
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Appendix A. Sample of experimental stimuli used for the animal and object
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Direction Size Difference Word 1 Target Word 3
L lake hill
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Presentation of stimuli and dependent measures in Experiment 1 and 3. Encoding time is
measured as the gaze duration on the middle word. Decision time is the time from the onset
of the last word until the indication of a response by a speeded key-press. A gaze-contingent
display technique was used in which the words were masked except when the participant
looked at them during the first reading pass from left to right. This eliminated preview and
rereading of the first and middle word.
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Mean decision times (A) and middle word encoding times (B) for trials with small, medium
and large differences in semantic size between the middle and first item in Experiment 1.
Both measures show a symbolic distance effect. Gaze duration on the middle word and
decision time are shorter when the difference in semantic size between items is larger.
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Individuals’ mean middle-last ratio by the slope of the size-based effect on the middle word
in Experiment 1. There is a strong, negative relationship between the individuals’ mean
middle-last ratio and mean encoding slope. Individuals with a high middle-last ratio
(incremental judgment strategy) show a strong symbolic difference effect during middle
word gaze durations. Individuals with a low middle-last ratio (final judgment strategy) show
no systematic effect of size difference on middle word gaze durations.
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Multiple regression of single fixations duration, using word frequency (SUBTLEXus,
Brysbaert & New, 2009) and word length as predictors. Both word frequency and length are
known as robust predictors of encoding time of written words (Rayner, 1998).
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Encoding (as measured by gaze duration) and decision times for words and numbers in
Experiment 3. The decision times (A) and middle word encoding times (B) for the words
both show a symbolic distance effect. Decision as well as encoding times are shorter when
the difference in semantic size between the middle and first item is larger. The number
decision times (C) follow this pattern as well. Decision time decreases as the log difference
between the last and middle number increases. The encoding times of the middle number
(D) show the opposite pattern in the form of a numerical distance priming effect. Middle
number encoding times increase as the numerical difference between the middle and first
number increases.
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Individuals’ mean middle-last ratio by the slope of the size-based effect on the middle word
in Experiment 3. These results show the same pattern as Experiment 1. There is a strong,
negative relationship between the individuals’ mean middle-last ratio and mean encoding
slope. Individuals with a high middle-last ratio (incremental judgment strategy) show a
strong symbolic difference effect during middle word gaze durations. Individuals with a low
middle-last ratio (final judgment strategy) show no systematic effect of size difference on
middle word gaze durations.
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